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Abstract 
Audit fee studies, being a tool to assist negotiation between auditors and clients are regularly undertaken all over 
the world and essentially stem on the factors prevalent in the specific auditing/accounting environments. 
Unfortunately, Pakistan has been less explored in this regard with only two studies being conducted focusing its 
market. Both the studies used a single year data for analyses and were conducted in a less regulated environment 
than presently prevalent in Pakistan.  After the establishment of SECP and regulatory changes in corporate sector, 
no such study has been conducted in Pakistan. Using the Simunic (1980) model, this study reveals that client’s 
size of business, complexity of business and international recognition and affiliation of audit firms (Big four 
firms) are significant determinants of audit fee in Pakistan. Results in study indicate that ignorance of risk factor 
by the auditors may pose serious threat to fame and reputation of audit firm along with indication of feeble legal 
regime in Pakistan. 
Keywords: Audit fee, client’s size of business, audit complexity, audit risk, big firm 
 
Introduction 
The importance of auditors cannot be ignored in present times. The report presented by auditor acts as a medium 
of communication between the users of financial statements and auditor. The decisions of stakeholders or users 
are highly dependent upon this report. This report explains about the faithfulness with which the financial 
statements of company have been prepared. In almost every country, there are laws which require the companies 
to verify their financial statements from external auditors. The existence of such laws has led to creation of audit 
market and competition among audit firms. These firms not only fulfill the purpose of authenticating the 
financial statements of companies but also render consultancy and advisory services. The pricing of services 
rendered by firms varies from firm to firm.  
 
1.1 Pricing of audit services 
Pricing of audit services has been an interesting issue for the researchers and different studies were conducted to 
explore the factors that determine the audit fee charged by an auditing firm. The knowledge of these factors is 
helpful both for client and the auditor. This leads to a better negotiation between client and auditor (Al-Harshani, 
2008). Auditor fee is determined on the basis of characteristics specific to auditing firm and client. However, 
engagement attributes are also significant determinants of audit fee.  Characteristics of client include: size of its 
business, complexity of its business and risk of liquidation or risk in doing the audit of business. Auditor 
characteristic is mainly its affiliation and recognition across the world and country. While engagement attributes 
include year of end and report lag (difference between submission date of annual report and actual submission 
date). 
Hay (2010) conducted a meta-analysis of the audit fee studies conducted up to year 2007 and presented 
an overall result of these studies. In his study, he discusses the audit fee determinants that have been used in all 
studies conducted regarding pricing of audit services. The numbers of studies which he included in his study are 
equal to 313. Results of his study show that auditors charge fee on the basis of three attributes. These three 
attributes are client specific (client’s business size, client’s risk and client complexity), auditor specific (big or 
non-big firm) and engagement (busy season). His study shows that client’s size of business has significant 
positive relationship with audit fee in all studies while other attributes of client i.e. client’s complexity of 
business and client’s risk show mixed results. Hay (2010) says that majority of studies indicate that big firms 
charge premium in audit fees. Busy season is an important variable but it shows significant relationship with 
audit fee in few studies (Hay, 2010).  
The objective of this study is to examine whether traditional determinants (client size, client 
complexity and client risk) of audit fee are significant or not in context of Pakistan. In addition, other measures 
of audit fee i.e. origin of company, busy season which have not been explored by Simon and Taylor, (1997) 
would also be explored in this study.  
The focus of audit related studies has been the developed countries and a very little research has been 
conducted in emerging economies like Pakistan (Hay, 2010). Only two audit fee studies conducted by Ahmed 
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and Goyal, (2005), and Simon and Taylor, (1997) has focused on the Pakistani market. Therefore, it is necessary 
to conduct a study which explores audit fee determinants along with other determinants that have not been 
explored in Pakistan. 
Ahmed and Goyal, (2005) studied the Pakistani market along with the other markets i.e. India and 
Bangladesh. Simon and Taylor, (1997) focused solely on Pakistani market but the data was quite old i.e. 1995. 
After 1995, different regulatory changes have taken place at corporate sector in Pakistan. The major change was 
establishment of Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan in 1997 under SECP Act 1997. The 
establishment of SECP brought different regulatory changes at the corporate sector. SECP implemented such 
policies which had direct impact on auditors e.g. auditors are to be changed after five years which impact audit 
fee (Cary et al, 2006). 
 
1.2 Legal framework in Pakistan 
In Pakistan, laws and regulations regarding the companies are laid down in Companies Ordinance 1984. Every 
company in Pakistan, when it gets registered, has to abide by the rules laid down in Companies Ordinance 1984. 
Moreover, Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan (SECP), which governs the mechanism of stock 
exchanges across the country, ensures that every listed company on stock exchange complies by the rules and 
regulations of Companies Ordinance 1984. As the current study has association with financial reporting, so it is 
necessary to shed some light on the rules and regulations laid down in Companies Ordinance 1984 regarding 
financial reporting. 
Financial reporting is covered by section 230 to 247 of Companies Ordinance 1984. It says that all the 
companies should maintain their accounts and present their accounts to shareholders and public in order to show 
a true and fair view of matters of companies.  Moreover, Companies Ordinance 1984, in order to protect the 
interests of shareholders and investors, directs every company to verify its accounts from an independent auditor.  
Section 237(3) of Companies Ordinance 1984 says that: 
“The balance sheet or the profit and loss account or income and expenditure account shall be audited 
by the auditor of company and the auditor’s report shall be attached thereto” 
Moreover, regarding the appointment of auditor, section 252 of Companies Ordinance 1984 says: 
“Every company shall at each annual general meeting appoint an auditor to hold office from 
conclusion of that meeting until the conclusion of next annual general meeting” 
SECP is the sole regulator for Corporate Sector and it aims to enhance the safety of investors by 
implementing such rules and regulations which enhance the financial transparency in Corporate Sector. The 
financial transparency cannot be improved until a fair auditing mechanism is established at corporate sector. 
Hence SECP implemented Code of Corporate Governance1 to improve and enhance the financial transparency 
across the corporate sector. For example under the Code of Corporate Governance, the listed companies have to 
hire the auditors which fulfill the criteria of Quality Control Review (QCR) program. Quality Control Review 
program is basically meant to enhance the quality of audit and certain requirements are there which have to be 
fulfilled by auditing firm in order to audit a listed company. QCR program is run by the ICAP2 which performs 
checks on auditing firms. The members of ICAP responsible for QCR program (called as Quality Assurance 
Board) ensure that the auditing mechanism of an auditing firm is viable and fair enough to detect and disclose 
the misrepresentations and concealing of a client being audited. These quality checks are performed on the usual 
audit conducted by an auditing firm.  
SECP also requires the listed companies to change their auditors after every five years so that quality 
of audit is not compromised by the long tenure of single audit (Cary et al, 2006). Hence these regulations which 
aim to increase the financial transparency have improved the quality of audit conducted by auditing firms. Thus 
it is necessary to conduct a new audit fee study as the corporate sector of Pakistan has undergone wide changes 
after 2002. 
 
1.3 Purpose and significance of study 
A very scant literature is available on pricing of audit services is in Pakistan. Pakistan has undergone wide 
changes after establishment of Securities and Exchange Commission (SECP) which have been discussed above. 
Moreover, previous studies used a one year data for analysis, while this study uses more recent five years data 
from 2007-2011. Therefore, this study provides a better analysis of audit fee determinants. 
 
1.4 Rationale of the study 
The study of pricing of audit services market in different countries is beneficial as it helps in understanding the 
similarities and differences in those countries. This increases the knowledge of economics of audit services and it 
                                                           
1 Code of Corporate Governance was first implemented in 2002 and is revised regularly. It was recently revised in 2012. 
2Institute of Chartered Accountants of Pakistan 
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helps in development and harmonizing of international auditing and accounting standards. Further, these studies 
help the legislators as well as auditors in devising policies regarding audit pricing.  
 
1.5 Practical implications of study 
The practical advantage of this study is that it will help the legislators as well as auditors in devising policies 
regarding audit pricing. This study will help in gaining knowledge of economics of audit services in Pakistan and 
will ultimately help in development and harmonizing of international auditing and accounting standards. 
Moreover it will help auditor and clients in Pakistan to better negotiate the auditing fees. The strictness of legal 
liability regime in Pakistan will also be explored through this study by looking at the fact that how much 
weightage do auditors in Pakistan give to risk factors. This will help the regulators to improve the legal 
environment of Pakistan. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: chapter two reviews the literature of audit fee 
determinants, chapter three describes research strategy and methodology used to find out determinants of audit 
fee while, chapter four explains the statistical analysis and results generated from audit fee models and chapter 
five concludes the study. 
 
Review of Literature 
2.1 Audit fee and its determinants 
Literature on pricing of audit services is quite rich and a number of studies have been conducted in this regard in 
different countries. The first empirical evidence on the pricing of audit services was presented by Simunic (1980). 
The work by Simunic (1980) paved the way for future researchers to conduct audit fee studies in different 
countries. Simunic (1980) says that the price charged by auditors is function of: a) resources utilized by auditor 
in auditing and b) the opportunity cost of conducting an audit. He concludes that auditors charge fee on the basis 
of client specific and auditor specific attributes.  After the work of Simunic (1980), researchers extended the 
literature of pricing of audit services and further analyzed and explored these determinants in different 
institutional settings. However, the model used is quite similar to the model of Simunic (1980) and has shown 
robustness across different countries and settings. Some of new attributes like engagement attributes have also 
been explored by researchers. 
Review of studies on client specific attributes, auditor attribute and engagement attribute which are 
used in this study are discussed ahead. 
2.1.1 Client’s size of business 
Client’s size of business has always been a significant determinant of audit fee and exhibits a positive 
relationship with audit fee. Causholli et al. (2011), in their study regarding overview of empirical research 
related to audit fee find out that client’s size of business is the most significant determinant of audit fee among 
all other determinants. The reason for positive and significant relationship of audit fee with size of client’s 
business is that labor usage and effort of auditor gets high as the size of company’s business gets high. Causholli 
et al. (2011), say that common proxy for measuring clients’ size of business is natural log of assets or sales while 
some of studies, however, have used number of employees as proxy for client’s size of business.  
A recent study by Fleischer (2012) provides evidence of German market regarding the relation 
between client’s size and audit fee by using a different proxy than actually used for client’s size of business. His 
study uses number of employees as proxy for client’s size of business. Results of study show that client’s size of 
business has highest explanatory power and shows a significant positive relationship with audit fee. 
2.1.2 Complexity of business 
Complexity is a measure of audit difficulty (Boon et al, 2005). A complex business is difficult to audit and hence 
high fee is charged by auditors for complex business. This fact is however, not always true and there are mixed 
evidences regarding complexity of business and high audit fee.  
A recent study by Cohen (2013) of Greek market, for instance, presents evidence that auditors charge 
high fee for complex business. His study covers public sector of Greece. Cohen (2013) says that auditing 
inventory is time consuming and therefore auditors do extra effort in verifying physical quantities of inventory 
and thus charge high fee which increases cost of audit.Moreover, fixed assets also require extra effort and time 
for verification as auditors conduct tests in finding estimates of depreciation or impairment. 
Conflicting evidence regarding client’s complexity relationship with audit fee is found out by Ahmed 
and Goyal, (2005). They conducted a one year cross-sectional study on three markets i.e. India, Pakistan and 
Bangladesh with a sample size of 566 companies listed on the stock exchanges of those three countries. Ahmed 
and Goyal (2005), in their study find out that the client’s complexity has insignificant relationship with the audit 
fee for any of the country included in study. The authors conclude that insignificant relationship of client’s 
complexity with audit fee might be indication that the auditors in these countries determine their audit fee based 
on variables such as client’s size or auditor’s size and do not consider the complexity of business as determinant 
of audit fee. In other words auditors predetermine their audit fee and ignore firm specific attributes such as 
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client’s complexity of business, and this may lead to impairment of audit quality because every firm varies from 
other and using a single standardized auditing process for all of the firms cannot cater to the auditing needs of all 
firms.  
Insignificance or significance of client’s complexity cannot be confined to emerging or developed 
countries. Cantoni et al. (2010), in their study of UK charity sector also find insignificant relationship of 
complexity with audit fee. Complexity is measured in study by presence and number of subsidiaries or branches, 
area of activity and total number of funds in balance sheet. The results of study show that complexity has 
insignificant relationship with audit fee. 
Client’s complexity can have significant relationship with audit fee in emerging countries. This is 
shown by Naser et al. (2007), in their study of Jordan market, an emerging country. Naser et al. (2007), measure 
complexity by using balance sheet measure (sum of inventory and receivables) and number of business segments 
in which company operates are used as proxy for client’s complexity. Using OLS method, they find out a 
significant positive relationship of complexity with audit fee. This supports the assertion that complexity of 
business increases the auditor’s effort and therefore auditors compensate themselves by charging high fee.  
Therefore, the studies indicate that the complexity of business has got conflicting evidences and there 
is a room for improvement in this regard. This study will therefore help in finding empirical evidence regarding 
the relationship between audit fee and client’s complexity of business. 
2.1.3 Audit or client’s risk 
Audit or client’s risk is an important determinant of audit fee and in almost all the studies conducted regarding 
audit fee, risk of client has significant positive relationship with the audit fee (Hay, 2010). Audit risk is basically 
the risk that the auditors would be held liable for failure of business or misstatements in financial statements. 
Meanwhile, audit risk can also be due to loss of fee revenue and reputation damage (Elliot, 2008). Auditors 
assess the risk in conducting the audit of business and on the basis of risk perceived by them, they charge an 
extra fee which is called as risk premium. Risk premium is based on different factors e.g. the business condition 
i.e. whether the business is in losses or in profits, legal regime of that country, the degree to which external users 
rely on financial statements etc. Brum field et al. (1983), first provided the evidence regarding risk premium 
charged by auditors i.e. auditors charge extra fee from clients whose risk is high.   
Charles et al. (2010), point out that usually auditors assess the risk of client before conducting its audit. 
They say that when auditors feel that risk of client is high then they increase the amount of evidences and in 
doing so the effort and cost of audit increases which is compensated by high fee.  Charles et al. (2010), say that 
the accounting or auditing scandals in 2000 and 2001 brought bad name to the auditing firms and the demise of 
Arthur Anderson, Dot com crash raised eyebrows on the performance and professional quality of auditing firms. 
After such scandals and issues it became common to blame the auditors in case of any business failure. Their 
study show that the auditors charge a high fee for the firms where they perceive risk to be high and hence put 
extra effort in conducting the audit of such companies.  
The auditors seek insurance cover for risk and tailoring the audit fee according to client’s risk is 
rational behavior of auditor from economic point of view. A study by Neimi (2002) Finland market prove the 
assertion that the client’s having high risk than others are charged extra fee than the average fee. Moreover, 
listed companies are charged high fee as auditors feel risk for those clients is high. Auditors therefore, charge 
risk premium for compensating themselves in case of litigation.  
As discussed earlier, the audit risk not only depends upon financial health of client but also on rules, 
regulations and litigation environment in that country. Lin et al. (2008), in their study of US market find out that 
as the rules and regulations become stringent, then the audit fee increases. They say that Sarbanes Oxley (SOX) 
Act 1has increased workload of auditors and as the requirements to comply with rules increase, risk of auditors 
increase. Lin et al. (2008), say that auditors put extra effort in ensuring that financial statements are prepared in 
accordance with the rules and regulations which results in increased costs for auditors. Auditors in result pass 
those costs to clients.  
A study by Choi et al. (2008), addresses the auditor’s risk premium in context of legal regime and 
litigation environment of country. This study is interesting as it also addresses legal regime and environment of 
Pakistan. Choi et al. (2008), tested the assertion that audit fee increase as country’s legal regime becomes strict. 
Study uses 21559 observations from 15 countries covering a time span of seven years i.e. 1996-2002. Client 
specific litigation risk are measured by loss, ROA and leverage, while Wingate litigation index is used to 
measure strictness of legal regime of country. Countries having Wingate litigation index of above 10 is 
considered strict in legal regime while converse is true for countries having value less than 10. Pakistan scores 
less than 10 and is a country with less strict legal regime. Results show that after controlling for other factors, 
strength or strictness of country’s legal liability regime has an impact on audit fee.  
                                                           
1 Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002 was passed to protect investors by increasing the disclosure and other requirements related to 
financial reporting 
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Similar kinds of results are shown by Seetharaman et al. (2002), in their study of UK firms which listed their 
securities in UK as well as in USA (cross listing) for the purpose of raising the capital for their business. 
Seetharaman et al. (2002), say that the auditor’s cost function consists of resource cost component and expected 
liability loss component. The expected loss component is the amount auditors have to pay if litigation is filed 
against them and they are held responsible for the failure of business which is simply the litigation risk. Thus the 
auditors in order to compensate the expected liability loss component will charge a premium from clients which 
vary from client to client according to their risk of business failure and the level of litigious environment in 
which those clients carry out their business operations. The results of the study by Seetharaman et al. (2002), 
support the fact that auditors charge a high fee for country operating in high litigious environment and the UK 
auditors charge high fee for UK firms which list their shares in USA while the auditors do not charge a high fee 
for the UK firms which conduct their operation indigenously.  
Audit tests can not disclose all the possible misstatements in a financial statement and therefore the 
auditors add a risk premium in their audit fee to avoid losses due to undiscovered errors and misstatements. 
Calderon et al. (2012), say that the auditors can never disclose all misstatements in financial statements as the 
time for conducting audit is limited and auditors rely on sampling techniques. The auditors therefore invariably 
charge extra fee in order to mitigate the risk arising from limited time available to them for conducting audit and 
such extra fee or premiums compensate the auditors for the potential loss associated in conducting an audit. 
Keeping in view the different modes of audit risk, this study will add to literature by exploring that 
whether auditors in Pakistan concern about risk factor or not. The results will also tell about the litigation 
environment in Pakistan as auditors will care for risk factor if they feel they are held liable for audit failure.  
2.1.4 Auditor size (Big four firms) 
The auditor size (Big firm versus non-Big firm) is an important determinant of audit fee charged by the auditor 
and majority of studies show that auditor size is a significant determinant of audit fee (Hay, 2010). The auditing 
firms are called as big due to their international recognition and worldwide services and they charge high fee 
than non-big firms which is called as big firm effect or big firm premium. 
Research has shown different results regarding the reasons to choose and pay the big firm high audit 
fee than the others. Knechel et al. (2008), say that the benefits of conducting an audit are numerous and the 
simplest of which is to improve the quality of financial statements. The results of their study show that the 
decision to hire a big auditor depends upon the size or complexity of the business and the need for external 
financing. As the size of business is increased it is difficult to manage and effectively control the business which 
results in the increased complexity of business. The complexity of business increases the labor force and the big 
firms are hired to ensure that the operational efficiency is not compromised. Knechel et al. (2008), study shows 
that the firms which need external financing for their businesses hire big auditors as investors consider the 
financial statements audited by the big firms of high quality.  
Big firm effect has also been observed in the emerging countries which normally do not care for audit 
quality and auditing requirements and laws in those countries are not as stringent as compared to developed 
countries. A study by Michas (2010) covers emerging countries because of the fact that laws for protection of 
investors are not as strict as in other countries and therefore auditors are not bound to conduct quality audit. 
Therefore performance and choice of big firms in those countries gain importance. He says that clients chose big 
firms to signal high corporate governance and they pay those big firms high fee than non-big firms for quality 
audit.  
2.1.4.1 Big firm audit quality evidence 
Big firms are usually famous for the quality audit conducted by them and it can be argued that the high fee 
charged by them compels them to conduct a quality audit. Moreover, big firms have built their reputation for 
conducting the audit honestly and therefore they conduct high quality audit in order to avoid damages caused to 
their honest or reputation. 
Chia et al. (2007), show the evidence that the big firms conduct a high quality audit than the others and 
that’s why these firms charge high fee. Chia et al. (2007), say that audit quality depends upon the independence 
upon of auditor and an independent auditor is better able to perform his duties than the dependent auditor. The 
study is analyzes the companies during period of Asian financial crises as in the time of crises, managers are 
motivated to manipulate or misstate the earnings in order to avert the threat of being bankrupt. Chia et al. (2007), 
find out that big firms conduct high quality audit as those firms do not want their reputation and integrity to be 
impaired. Moreover, big firms are least dependent upon any of their client as they are paid highly by almost 
every client and they have wide range of clients.  
As the big firms have got high revenue than the non-big firms, so in case of litigations or lawsuits 
these firms are going to suffer highly. It is not only the protection of reputation and honor that motivate big 
auditors to conduct high quality audit, but the fear of losing money in case of litigation may also be a possible 
reason behind the high quality audit. Sun et al. (2011), say that the litigation risk for auditor increases with the 
increase in earnings management by client. It is generally perceived that the big auditor will be better able to 
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constrain the earnings management and thus conducting a high quality audit. The results of the study show that 
the big firms are more effective than the non-big firms in constraining the earnings management of clients 
having high litigation risk. The study of Sun et al. (2011), indicates that the audit quality differentiation of big 
firms is due to deep pocket hypothesis i.e. in case of high litigation firm Big firms are more likely to be sued and 
therefore perform a high quality audit.  
2.1.4.2 Big firm effect 
Although big firm effect is shown by many studies but still there are evidences which negate the big firm effect. 
Some of the evidences regarding big firm effect are discussed ahead. 
Belgian market was studied by Caneghem (2010) to find out that whether the Big firms charge 
premium in Belgian market or not. He analyzed non listed firms as the non-listed firms may or may not pay 
premium to the big firms. The reason for not paying premium is that the non-listed firms are not part of the 
capital market and therefore they do not have pressure to hire a big auditor. On the other hand, big firms may 
charge premium from non-listed firms because the high quality audit by big firms resulting in high quality 
financial statements may allow the non-listed firm to obtain finance easily at lower cost from financial 
institutions. The results of the study show that big firm effect is seen in Belgian market and big firms charge 
premium from companies even when they are not listed on stock exchanges. 
Contrary to the above evidence, Al-harshani (2008) in his study of Kuwait market finds no effect of 
big firm on audit fee. Kuwait is an emerging market and rules and regulations are in the phase of implementation. 
Moreover, being a small country the nature of audit market is quite different from the developed countries. He 
says that there is no difference between the audit fee charged by big firm and non-big firm. The results of his 
study negate the results of earlier studies which claim that the premium is charged in audit fee by big firms. This 
shows that the clients in Kuwait do not differentiate between the quality of big and non-big firms and it also 
shows that big firm effect does not hold true in Kuwait. 
Similar kinds of findings are shown by Karim and Hasan (2012). They study Bangladeshi market as it 
is an emerging economy and audit market is growing due to the surge in economic growth. They use traditional 
model of audit fee with audit fee as dependent variable and audit size, audit risk, audit complexity, busy season, 
big firm affiliation as independent variables. The results of study show that the big firms do not dominate the 
audit market of Bangladesh and it merely audits 16% of the listed firms on D1SE.  
Besacier et al (2007), however, find out evidence of big firm premium in their study of French quoted 
firms. In France, if a company wants to publish a consolidated financial statement then two independent auditors 
are to be appointed for the auditing process. The joint audit by two auditing firms provides twofold perspective 
on the accounts of company. As a result of which the independence of auditors is strengthened. Besacier et al 
(2007), find out that the big firm effect exists in France and the big firms charge premium in the audit fee. They 
further find out that when one among the two auditing firms is a big firm then the audit fee charged is high than 
the firms which do not hire a Big firm for auditing.  
As shown by review of studies, big firm effect is shown in majority of studies but there are evidences 
that negate the big firm effect. This study will add to literature by finding that whether big firm effect exists in 
Pakistan or not.  
2.1.5 Busy season 
Busy season depends upon the time period in which the financial year of companies and Government closes. It 
also depends upon the fact that whether the private auditing firms conduct the audit of Government or not. In 
former subcontinent countries including Pakistan the financial year usually ends on 30th of June and auditors are 
perceived to be busy in those days. Therefore they are expected to charge high rates than they charge during the 
whole year.  
This determinant of audit fee has however been less explored in audit fee studies and a limited number 
of studies shows its significance. For example recent evidence by Karim and Hasan (2012), show that busy 
season effect is not observed in Bangladeshi market. Using traditional Simunic (1980) model for finding 
determinants of audit fee, they find out that busy season variable shows an insignificant relationship with audit 
fee. According to Karim and Hasan (2012), auditors predict the workload and therefore they do not feel 
burdened in conducting audit in busy season. 
As explained earlier, in Pakistan the financial year of most of the businesses ends on 30th June and it is 
therefore important to know whether the auditors charge extra fee or not in those days. This study will try to 
answer this research query by exploring busy season effect in Pakistan and will add empirical evidence to 
literature. 
 
 
 
                                                           
1 Dhaka Stock Exchange 
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Research strategy and methodology 
3.1 Research Problem 
The two audit fee studies conducted in Pakistan by Ahmed and Goyal, (2005), and Simon and Taylor, (1997) 
show somehow different and conflicting evidences regarding audit fee determinants in Pakistan. For example, 
Ahmed and Goyal, (2005), say that auditors in Pakistan charge fee irrespective of complexity of businesses, 
while Simon and Taylor, (1997) negates the findings of former. Thus there is a room for improvement in audit 
fee studies regarding Pakistan which will be covered in this research.   
 
3.2 Data and sample size 
This study uses secondary data and the companies listed on Karachi Stock Exchange (KSE) 100 index have been 
included in the study. The study uses amount of audit fee paid by companies and only the companies listed on 
KSE-100 index are bound to disclose the audit fee in the footnotes of their annual reports (Section 230, 
Companies Ordinance 1984).The study uses convenient sampling because of data availability issues and only 
non-financial firms have been used in the study due to the differing asset structure and revenue generation 
pattern of financial firms..   
Additionally, a company is included in the analysis if it meets the following criteria: 
• It should have annual reports from the year 2007 to 2011 
• It should have disclosed audit fee in all of the years under analysis 
• It should have generated sales in all of its years under analysis 
On the basis of above criteria, 150 companies from seven sectors were selected for the analysis. 
Annual reports of each company were retrieved from its website. 
The following table describes the number of companies included in the sample from each sector.  
Table 3.1 Sector wise summary of companies selected in the sample 
S.No Name of Sector Number of Companies 
1 Automobile 10 
2 Chemicals 16 
3 Construction & Cement 23 
4 Food Producers 20 
5 General Industries 11 
6 Oil Sector 11 
7 Textile 59 
 Total 150 
Number of companies included in the sample from textile sector is highest because this sector has got 
the highest number of companies among all sectors of KSE-100 index.  
 
3.3 Audit fee   
Auditor fee is determined by number of factors and generally those are divided into two types i.e. client specific 
and auditor specific factors. Client specific factors are those factors that relate to the client e.g. size of client’s 
business, liquidity etc. While auditor specific characteristics are the ones relating to auditor e.g. reputation of 
auditor, affiliation with big audit groups etc. This study tries to find out the determinants that are significant in 
Pakistan while in the negotiation of audit fee.  
3.3.1 Determinants of audit fee 
Determinants of audit fee are found out by using the conventional Simunic (1980) model with addition of two 
variables i.e. MNC (Multinational Company) and Year. All the studies conducted regarding audit fee follow 
Simunic (1980), model with some modifications according to the situation (Hay, 2010). Model used for finding 
the determinants of auditor fee is discussed below along with the variables that act as surrogate of those 
determinants: 
3.3.1.1 Model for audit fee determinants 
Following the study of Choi et al. (2010), model used for determining the factors of auditor fee in Pakistan is as 
follows: 
Model 1: 
 
Where; 
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INVREC = Inventory plus receivables  
SEG = Square root of number of business segments in which the company operates 
CR = Liquidity measure (current ratio).  
ROA = Return on Assets.  
LOSS = Dummy variable for loss. Equal to 1 if firm experienced a loss during the year.  
BIG4 = Dummy variable for Big 4 firm. Equal to 1 if the auditing firm is from BIG4 
YEAR = Dummy variable for year end. Equal to 1 if the financial year of company ends on 30th    June  
MNC = Dummy variable for origin of company. Equal to 1 if firm is Multinational company.  
ε = Error Term 
Client size of Business 
Studies have revealed that, the size of client’s business is considered to be the most important determinant of 
audit fee (Hay, 2010). The expected relationship for this variable is positive, as the size of client’s business 
increases then the amount of work to be done by auditor also increases. This study measures client’s size by 
taking natural log of its assets. 
Audit Complexity 
It is natural to say that a complex business requires more effort and time to get audited than simple business. 
Audit complexity is an important determinant of audit fee and a complex business requires an increased effort 
and therefore it results in high audit fee. The expected relationship of audit complexity with audit fee is positive. 
This study measures audit complexity by two variables: 1) segment variable (found by taking square root of 
business segments in which the company operates) and 2) the sum of inventory and receivables of company. 
Audit (Client) Risk 
The risk involved in conducting the audit of client’s business is called as client or audit risk. Auditors charge 
fees in commensurate with the riskiness of client’s business (Calderon et al., 2012). The current study measures 
audit risk by three variables: 1) current ratio, 2) Return on asset and 3) a dummy variable loss. Current ratio is a 
measure of firm’s liquidity and is found by dividing current assets over current liabilities. Return on asset is 
measure of firm’s profitability and is found by dividing net income over total assets. Relationship of these both 
variables is expected to be negative with audit fee which means that auditor will charge fewer fees for a 
company which is highly liquid and highly profitable. Therefore we can say that higher these ratios are, lower is 
the level of risk in business and, therefore, lower is the audit risk. Relationship of profitability variable i.e. ROA 
can also be positive with the audit fee and auditors charge high fee for companies which are profitable (Al-
harshani, 2008). Third variable of audit risk is dummy variable loss which is equal to 1 if the firm experiences a 
loss in the current year and 0 otherwise. Relationship of this variable is expected to be positive with the audit fee 
because of the rationale that, auditors consider the risk in auditing the companies with losses as high than the 
companies which do not experience loss. Overall, it is expected that audit risk increases the audit fee charged by 
auditor. 
Auditor Size 
Auditor size based on its reputation and affiliation with big auditing firms influences the audit fee charged by 
auditors.  Literature of auditing shows that, there were initially eight firms called as Big due to their worldwide 
reputation and highest market share in terms of number of clients audited. This group of eight firms was known 
as the "Big Eight", and it was then reduced to the "Big Six" and then "Big Five" by a number of mergers. The 
Big Five reduced to Big Four after the demise of Arthur Andersen in 2002, due to its involvement in the Enron 
scandal (Casterella et al, 2010). These Big four firms charge high fee because of the superiority they possess in 
terms of technology and skill. Big four firms are either working themselves in a country or they have got 
affiliates working in that country. In Pakistan, affiliates of these firms are working and detail of which is shown 
in the following table:  
Table 3.2 Big four firms and their affiliates in Pakistan 
S.No Name of the Big Four Firm Affiliate in Pakistan 
1 PwC (officially PricewaterhouseCoopers) A. F. Ferguson & Co. 
2 Deloitte Touché Tohmatsu M. YousufAdilSaleem& Co 
3 Ernst & Young Ernst & Young Ford Rhodes SidatHyder 
4 KPMG KPMG TaseerHadi& Co. 
This study measures audit fee by proxy variable Big4 which will be 1 if the auditing firm belongs to 
any of the affiliates of Big four firm and otherwise it is 0. The expected relationship of Big four firm with audit 
fee is positive. 
Business/ Financial Year 
The auditing firms might get busy in the days when financial year of Government is ending and therefore, those 
firms charge high fee to companies whose ending year is same of Government (Karim&Hasan, 2012). In 
Pakistan, officially the financial year ends at 30th of June. It is expected that the auditing firms get busy in these 
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days and hence charge high audit fees in these days. So year-end dummy variable is used to capture the busy 
season effect and is equal to 1 if the client’s business year also ends at 30th of June. A positive relationship is 
expected between the year-end dummy variable and the audit fee.      
Origin of Company 
It is presumed that multinational companies adhere to the auditing standards and do not compromise on the 
quality of audit (Ahmed &Goyal, 2005). Therefore these companies select high profile auditing firms for the 
audit and spend high amount on auditing process. A dummy variable MNC is used for capturing this effect. 
MNC would be equal to 1 if the firm being audited is multinational company. The relationship of MNC variable 
with audit fee is positive. 
The following table shows the variable definition along with the expected sign: 
Table 3.3 Variables along with the definitions and expected sign (Audit fee determinants) 
Dependent Variable: AFEE 
Variable Definition: Natural log audit fee 
Independent Variable Variable Definition Expected Sign 
SIZE Natural log of total assets + 
INVREC Sum of inventory and receivables + 
SEG Square root of business segments of company + 
CR Current ratio = Current Assets / Current 
Liabilities 
- 
ROA Return on Assets = Net income/ Total Assets - 
LOSS Dummy variable for loss + 
BIG4 Dummy variable for Big 4 auditing firms + 
YEAR Dummy variable for year end + 
MNC Dummy variable for origin of company + 
The above mentioned variables shall be proxy for different determinants of audit fee which are shown in the 
following table: 
Table 3.4 Audit Fee determinants along with their proxies 
S.NO Determinant Proxy(ies) 
1 Client Size SIZE 
2 Audit Complexity 
INVREC 
SEG 
3 Audit Risk 
CR 
ROA 
LOSS 
4 Auditor Size BIG4 
5 Financial Year YEAR 
6 Origin of Company MNC 
Where SIZE is natural log of assets, INVREC is sum of inventory and receivables, SEG is square root 
of business segments in which business operates, CR is current ratio, ROA is return on assets, BIG4 is proxy for 
big four auditing firms, LOSS is proxy for loss in business, MNC is proxy for multinational company and YEAR 
is proxy for busy season. 
 
3.4 Hypotheses 
The study would test the following hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 1: 
“There is a positive relationship between fee charged by auditor and size of the client’s business” 
Hypothesis 2: 
There is a positive relationship between fee charged by auditor and complexity of client’s business” 
Hypothesis 3: 
There is a positive association between the audit risk and audit fee” 
Hypothesis 4: 
There is positive relationship between audit fee and auditor size 
Hypothesis 5: 
There is no relationship between audit fee and business year 
Hypothesis 6: 
“There is no relationship between audit fee and company’s origin (foreign or indigenous)” 
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3.5 Estimation Techniques 
As the study intends to find out the determinants of audit fee and relationship between audit fee and audit quality, 
so Ordinary Least Square (OLS) estimation method is used for this purpose. Pooled OLS method is used to find 
out the determinants of audit fee.  
 
Results and discussion 
4.1 Results of audit fee model 
First, descriptive analyses are discussed and after that pooled OLS results are discussed for audit fee model. 
Results of audit fee model are discussed below: 
4.1.1 Descriptive statistics for audit fee 
Descriptive Statistics for each variable of audit fee model is shown in the following table: 
Table 4.1 Descriptive Statistics of variables involved in determination of audit fee 
 AFEE SIZE 
INVREC 
(millions) 
SEG CR ROA BIG4 LOSS MNC YEAR 
Mean  12.98  22.01 198  1.115  1.266  0.043  0.496  0.291  0.180  0.776 
Median  13.11  21.86  72  1.000  1.003  0.030  0.000  0.000  0.000  1.000 
Max  15.47  25.74 1900  2.000  6.870  0.380  1.000  1.000  1.000  1.000 
Min  11.37  18.08 3.8  1.000  0.279 -0.185  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
Std. Dev.  0.737  1.54 318  0.262  0.866  0.080  0.500  0.454  0.385  0.417 
N 750 750 750 750 750 750 750 750 750 750 
Where AFEE is natural log of audit fee paid to auditor, SIZE is natural log of assets, INVREC is sum 
of inventory and receivables, SEG is square root of business segments in which business operates, CR is current 
ratio, ROA is return on assets, BIG4 is proxy for big four auditing firms, LOSS is proxy for loss in business, 
MNC is proxy for multinational company and YEAR is proxy for busy season. 
A total of 750 observations were used for the study of audit fee determinants. Audit fee for the firm 
(AFEE) which is measured by natural log of audit fee has a minimum value of 11.37 and maximum value of 
15.47. The mean value of audit fee is 12.98 with a standard deviation of 0.737. Size of client’s business (SIZE) is 
measured by natural log of total assets and varies from minimum of 18.08 to maximum of 25.74. The mean 
value of client’s size of business is 22.01 and standard deviation is 1.54. Sum of inventory and receivables 
(INVREC) has lowest value of 3.8 million and maximum value of 1900 million. These are measured in rupees 
and on average each company in sample has a sum of inventory and receivables equal to 198 million (Rs). The 
deviation of each industry’s sum of inventory and receivables i.e. standard deviation is equal to 318 million (Rs). 
Square root of business segments of company (SEG) has maximum value of 2.000 and a minimum of 1.000. 
While the average value is 1.115 which means that on average, companies operate in one business segment. 
Standard deviation of SEG variable is equal to 0.262. Current ratio (CR) shows the short term liquidity position 
of a company and it has a lowest value of 0.279, while maximum current ratio is 6.870. On average, companies 
have current ratio of 1.266 which means their current assets are 1.266 times higher than their current liabilities. 
Standard deviation of current ratio is equal to 0.866. Return on assets (ROA) shows a minimum value of -0.185 
and maximum of 0.380. The mean value of ROA is 0.043 which means that on average each company has a 
return on assets of 4.3 percent. The standard deviation is equal to 0.080. Big four (BIG 4) firm shows the 
affiliation of auditing company with big four firms. On average, 49.6 percent of auditing companies have 
affiliation with big four firms. Results show that companies which experience loss (LOSS) are 29.1 percent of 
sample. While MNC variable show that 18 percent of companies are multinational, and companies whose year 
ends on 30th June (YEAR) are 78 percent of sample. The reason for this is that major portion of sample 
comprises of textile and cement companies whose business year ends on 30th June.  
4.1.2 Regression results of audit fee 
Pooled OLS results are shown in the table below: 
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Table 4.2 Regression results of audit fee model 
Dependent Variable             AFEE 
Number of Observations            750 
Independent Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
C 6.699614 0.349792 19.15313 0.0000 
SIZE 0.256583 0.015696 16.34699 0.0000* 
INVREC 2.97E-11 7.67E-12 3.873296 0.0001* 
SEG 0.441525 0.072439 6.095117 0.0000* 
CR -0.031548 0.022585 -1.396821 0.1629 
ROA 1.118121 0.317480 3.521861 0.0005* 
BIG4 0.141325 0.039684 3.561265 0.0004* 
LOSS -0.006908 0.051698 -0.133627 0.8937 
MNC 0.061739 0.052829 1.168672 0.2429 
YEAR -0.002063 0.045842 -0.044996 0.9641 
 
R-squared 0.590252 F-statistic 118.4430  
Adjusted R-squared 0.585268 Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000  
*Significant at level of 1 percent   **Significant at level of 5 percent  
Where SIZE is natural log of assets, INVREC is sum of inventory and receivables, SEG is square root 
of business segments in which business operates, CR is current ratio, ROA is return on assets, BIG4 is proxy for 
big four auditing firms, LOSS is proxy for loss in business, MNC is proxy for multinational company and YEAR 
is proxy for busy season. 
Results of study show that size of client’s business has significant positive relationship with audit fee. 
The fact that labor usage and efforts of auditor increase with client’s size of business holds true in Pakistan 
(Fleischer, 2012) andresults are in accordance with the meta-analysis of Hay (2010).Therefore, first hypothesis 
of this study is supported. 
OLS results indicate that both measures of client’s complexity of business show a significant positive 
relationship with audit fee. Therefore, second hypothesis of study also holds true and it can be inferred from 
results that client’s complexity of business has significant positive association with audit fee. The positive 
relationship is due to the fact that complex business is difficult to audit. Additionally, inventory and receivables 
are difficult to audit (Cohen, 2013).Results of this study are contrary to what Ahmed &Goyal (2005) showed in 
their study. Their study shows an insignificant relationship of complexity with audit fee for Pakistan. The 
reasons for insignificant relationship of audit fee with complexity in study of Ahmed and Goyal (2005) may be 
less number of observations i.e. 300 and use of a single and relative proxy to measure audit complexity i.e. sum 
of inventory and receivables as a percentage of total assets.  
Out of three proxies for audit risk, client’s profitability i.e. ROA has significant relationship with audit 
fee. Moreover, the relationship of ROA with audit fee is opposite to what was expected. This shows that auditors 
do not care for risk factors rather they charge for by looking mainly at profitability of their client (Al-harashani, 
2007). Third hypothesis for the study is rejected and it can be inferred that risk of client or audit risk has not got 
a significant positive relationship with audit fee. Another possibility of insignificant relationship of audit risk 
with audit fee is that Pakistan has not got a strict legal regime and therefore auditors do not care for risk (Choi, 
2008).  
Results of study show that big firm effect is present in Pakistan. This shows that big firms are 
considered superior in Pakistan and they conduct quality audit, and therefore are given premium by clients. 
Additionally, Pakistan is a developing country and companies appoint big auditors to signal high corporate 
governance and high quality audit to investors (Michas, 2010). Results of this study regarding big firm effect 
support the results drawn by Ahmed and Goyal (2005), in their study of Pakistan market. Thus it can be 
concluded that big firms charge high fee from clients and fourth hypothesis is supported. 
OLS results show that busy season effect is not observed in Pakistan and auditors predict the workload 
and do not feel burdened while conducting audit in the time when Government year is ending (Karim and Hasan, 
2012). Thus fifth hypothesis is supported and it can be said that there is an insignificant relationship of busy 
season with audit fee.  
Origin of company shows insignificant relationship with audit fee as suggested by results of OLS 
estimation. This negates the fact that multinational companies follow high standards and spend high on auditors. 
On the basis of results, sixth hypothesis is supported and it can be said that there is an insignificant relationship 
of company’s origin with audit fee.  
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Conclusion 
This study examines a sample of 150 firms during the period 2007-2011 to explore audit fee determinants and 
relationship between audit fee and audit quality in Pakistan. Results indicate that size of client’s business, as 
reported in previous audit fee studies, remains the significant variable in determination of audit fee.  
Another interesting finding is that complexity of business appears to be a significant determinant of 
audit fee in Pakistan for the sample firms in this study. This result is in contrast to previous study of Ahmed and 
Goyal (2005), on Pakistan which reported no significant impact of complexity of business on audit fees. 
Moreover, it is shown by OLS results that both proxies of complexity show significant positive relationship with 
audit fee. So the assertion that complex businesses are difficult to audit and require extra time and effort holds 
true in Pakistan. 
The audit (client) risk factor shows an unusual result. Only a single proxy for risk i.e. client 
profitability has got significant relationship with audit fee. This shows that the risk factor is almost ignored in 
Pakistan by auditors. A rationale for this could be that, in Pakistan rules and regulations are not strict and hard 
like developed countries where mostly auditors are held liable and punished for manipulation of accounting 
figures. The risk factor is kept in by auditors in countries where the rules and regulations are strict and auditors 
are questioned for concealing and misrepresentations in financial statements. It can be concluded that auditors in 
Pakistan ignore the risk factor while negotiating audit fee. Ignoring of risk factor is a matter of concern for the 
auditors as they could be held liable for a failure of flop of business which may defame the auditor’s reputation. 
Results support the fact that big four auditors are significant determinant of audit fee. In Pakistan, big 
four firms charge extra fee for their services supporting the argument that big four firms render high quality audit 
services, and due to their superiority on non-big four firms in terms of technology and technique, they charge 
high audit fee. Thus it supports the fact that big four firms influence the audit fee. However, results of last year 
also give an impact that influence of big four firms in Pakistan is diminishing.  
In Pakistan, business year of the firm does not influence amount of audit fee charged by auditor and is 
not an important determinant of audit fee. Thus, auditors in Pakistan do not give importance to the business year 
of client while deciding audit fee. 
Results show that in Pakistan, multinational companies’ trend of spending high on auditors is absent.  
The rationale may be that multinational companies have started to maintain a strong internal audit mechanism 
and therefore do not spend extra on external auditors. 
Based on the findings of this study, there are certain recommendations. Such measures should be 
adopted which increase the scrutiny of auditing firms and auditors must be made bound to explore and take into 
account the risk factors in auditing a client as it is demanded and required by International Standards of Auditing. 
Moreover, there should be a proper mechanism for charging audit fee. For example certain firms charge very 
high fee premium while others are paid below their efforts. Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan 
(SECP) along with Institute of Charted Accountants of Pakistan (ICAP) must devise plans to address such issues.  
This study, however, has certain limitations. The analysis is limited to 150 companies due to the 
availability of data which may limit in generalization of results. Future researchers can focus upon certain issues 
not addressed in this study. For instance the low balling effect can further explain the varying audit fee charged 
by auditors.  
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